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From a critical rationalist perspective, I look at a fragment of 
the debate on shale gas exploration in the UK in order to make 
a proposal on the nature and representation of “conductive” 
argumentation, arguing it should not be viewed as a single 
argument, but in relation to deliberation as genre. There is no 
“conductive argumentation”, only various possible outcomes of 
deliberation, seen as critical testing of (alternative) proposals. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The literature on “conductive argumentation” is by now fairly extensive, 
including Wellman’s (1971) original statement of the problem, Govier’s 
(1999; 2010; 2011) crucial contributions, Blair and Johnson’s (2011) 
edited collection, as well as other significant developments (Hitchcock, 
2013) and useful critical reviews (van Laar, 2013; Paglieri, 2013). 
According to these sources, a typical illustration of “conductive” 
argumentation is a “pro/con” or “balance-of-considerations” argument, 
in which both reasons in favour and reasons against are (convergently 
and defeasibly) supporting a conclusion, for example  a practical 
conclusion – the agent ought to do A. Conductive arguments are taken to 
be single arguments (in favour of one conclusion) with two kinds of 
premises, positively and negatively relevant to the conclusion, with the 
reasons in favour outweighing the reasons against (called 
“counterconsiderations”). It has been suggested that, in addition to the 
pro and con sets of reasons, there should also be a specific premise that 
expresses the result of the process of weighing reasons, an OB (on-
balance) premise (Hansen, 2011). 
  2 
My proposal is to define “conductive” (pro/con) argumentation 
in favour of a practical-normative conclusion (the Agent ought to do A) 
in relation to deliberation as genre, and represent it as a possible 
configuration of the “deliberation scheme” I have developed in other 
publications (Fairclough, 2016; Fairclough, 2017). I suggest that there is 
no such thing as “conductive argument”, and that speaking about 
pro/con argumentation as a type of argument is possibly a category 
mistake. In order to understand what is involved in pro/con 
argumentation, a change of perspective or level is needed, from the level 
of simple argument schemes to the level of genre, the level at which 
various kinds of argument schemes are interrelated in pursuit of a 
higher-order function, e.g. rational decision-making. By focusing on 
deliberation, what is usually called “conductive” argumentation appears 
to be one of two main possible configurations or outcomes of a 
deliberative process, the one where a pro-conclusion can still be 
maintained, in spite of the existence of reasons against, because the 
reasons against are not strong enough to refute it, and the reasons in 
favour “outweigh” the reasons against. 
I advance this proposal from a critical rationalist logic of inquiry 
(Miller, 1994; 2006; 2013; 2014), seeing deliberation as the critical 
testing of alternative proposals for action, designed to enable rational 
decision-making. Critical testing of alternative proposals, resulting in 
the normative judgment that proposal An is not recommended (and 
ought to be discarded), but other proposals can be provisionally 
maintained, may be followed by choice of a “better” alternative among 
those proposals that have survived criticism and a decision to adopt 
that alternative. I propose two crucial distinctions: (a) between 
counterconsiderations (CCs) and critical objections (COs), arguing that, 
unlike CCs, COs can rebut a proposal; (b) between the concepts of 
outweighing and overriding reasons, which I see as occurring at different 
temporal stages in a deliberative process. Only if there are no overriding 
reasons against doing A, does it make sense for deliberating agents to 
move on to weighing the pros and the cons.  
The deliberation scheme I am suggesting (Figures 1-3) basically 
involves an argument from goals, circumstances and means-goal 
relations (tentatively supporting the conclusion in favour of proposal 
A); an argument from positive consequences (also tentatively 
supporting that conclusion), and an argument from negative 
consequences, which can conclusively rebut the hypothesis that A is the 
right course of action when the potential undesirable consequences are 
unacceptable. Deliberation typically starts with one or more agents 
having a stated goal G (or several) in a set of circumstances C (including 
“problems”), and an open question (what should be done?), in response 
to which agents will propose a course of action A (or several), intended 
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to transform their current circumstances into the future state-of-affairs 
corresponding to their goals (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012). Based on 
all the knowledge available, the agents might conjecture that they ought 
to do A1 (or A2 or A3…) to achieve G, in the circumstances. In order to 
decide rationally, the agents should subject each of these alternatives 
(hypotheses, conjectures) to critical testing, i.e. should try to expose 
potential negative consequences of each, and evaluate them as to their 
acceptability. Deciding to adopt proposal An will be reasonable if the 
conjecture (hypothesis) that An is the right course of action has been 
subjected to thorough critical testing in light of all the knowledge 
available and has withstood all attempts to find critical objections 
against it. A critical objection is an overriding reason why the action 
should not be performed. Unacceptable consequences (e.g. unacceptable 
impacts or risks of a course of action) are critical objections against a 
proposal and can conclusively rebut it. The purpose of critical testing is 
(1) to eliminate unreasonable proposals by examining their potential 
consequences; (2) to enable non-arbitrary choice of a better proposal, if 
several reasonable proposals have withstood criticism. 
Normatively speaking, the underlying logic of deliberation (and 
of practical pro/con argumentation) is a logic of inquiry, not advocacy 
or justification: arguers do not know in advance which proposal is 
recommended, but should endeavour to find out, by trying to find 
reasons against each, discarding some on this basis and then comparing 
the remaining ones against each other. The fact that no critical 
objections may have been uncovered does not mean that there are no 
counterconsiderations, no reasons against that proposal at all, nor does 
it mean that no critical objections are likely to be uncovered in the 
future. Counterconsiderations (I suggest) are reasons against the 
proposal that can be outweighed by the reasons in favour. Critical 
objections, by contrast, are reasons against the proposal that cannot be 
outweighed in this way, but in fact override the reasons in favour. What 
is a mere CC to someone may be a CO to someone else. The 
inconvenience of a very early start to catch an early flight may be a CC to 
one person, for whom the cheaper cost of that flight outweighs the 
disadvantages, but may be a CO to someone else, for whom the 
inconvenience overrides whatever arguments in favour there may be. 
 
2. ARGUING FOR AND AGAINST SHALE GAS EXPLORATION 
 
I will test my conception of conductive argumentation against a few 
examples taken from the controversy on shale gas exploration in the UK, 
specifically from the debate that took place in the Lancashire County 
Council (LCC) on whether to approve the applications for hydraulic 
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fracturing submitted by oil-and-gas drilling company Cuadrilla.1  
Following extensive deliberation over several days (23-29 June 2015) 
by  the LCC Development Control Committee, including speeches against 
and in favour of the proposal by members of the public, the applications 
were rejected on account of unacceptable impacts. In rejecting the 
applications, councillors voted against the views of their own planning 
officers, who had recommended approval. Here is the Planning Officer’s 
presentation – in an abbreviated form combining summary and direct 
quotation: 
 
According to all the evidence and expert opinion, the objections raised 
by the opponents are “not sustainable” (“cannot be supported”). It 
would therefore be “unreasonable” to delay making a decision. “Whilst 
there would be some negative impacts” (traffic, noise, dust, visual 
impact, loss of agricultural land), “most particularly for those living in 
the closest proximity to the site, they would be for a temporary period” 
and “could be minimized by the use of conditions”. “It is therefore 
concluded that there would not be any unacceptable impacts 
associated with the proposal” on traffic, air quality, visual and noise 
grounds, and to refuse the application on such grounds “would be 
unsustainable”. Furthermore, the Environment Agency has concluded 
that the risks of water and soil contamination are “very low”. 
Consequently, “refusing the application in view of the risks to surface 
or ground water contamination … would be unsustainable”. All risks 
can be controlled by the “permitting process” and “regulatory regime” 
in place. If approved, the development would achieve important goals 
(“would establish the presence and viability of exploiting an 
indigenous resource … which could contribute to the national energy 
needs, maintaining a diverse energy supply, and would bring some 
local benefits to the area in terms of employment and contributions to 
the local economy”). “It would not be acceptable to dismiss such 
exploration where it would not have an unacceptable impact that could 
not be adequately controlled and meet the policies of national guidance 
and the development plan.” “It is considered that the proposal 
complies with the national guidance and the policy of the development 
plan” and all other relevant legislation, except SP2 & EP11 of the Fylde 
Local Plan (seeing as it constitutes “industrial development in the 
countryside”).  However, “there is sufficient justification to override 
these two policies” in this case; “little weight should be attached to 
[them]… and more weight should be attached to the policies of 
minerals and waste”. “So, in conclusion, overall, after extensive 
consultations and assessment of the proposals in light of the responses, 
representations, and most particularly and importantly against the 
policies of the development plan for the area, I am of the view that the 
                                                             
1 This is a corpus of approximately 130,000 words, transcribed from the video 
recordings of the 4 days of deliberations by Phillip Norris (UCLAN). 
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principle of the development is acceptable or can be made acceptable 
by the use of conditions…”. “I therefore recommend that… planning 
permission be granted subject to the conditions set out in the report…”. 
 
This is a conductive argument in which objections, mainly in the form of 
“impacts”, are acknowledged (using the same argumentative indicator 
to express a concessive relation: “whilst there would be emissions…”/ 
“whilst [the drill] would still be visually apparent…”/ “whilst it is 
acknowledged that these operations would be noisy…”/ “whilst there 
would be some negative impacts…”), but are not considered serious 
enough to rebut the proposal, seeing as they can be “minimized” or 
“made acceptable by the use of conditions”. As for risks, they are said to 
be very low, by implication manageable, therefore not unacceptable 
either. Regarding conflict with existing legislation, it is considered that 
the application complies with all relevant national and local legislation, 
save two local policies, which can be “overridden”. In other words, 
although, in principle, laws provide non-overridable reasons against 
proposals which go against them (e.g. local people’s rights or 
government’s obligations must not be violated), this particular conflict is 
not unacceptable and does not suggest the proposal should be 
discarded. (For another perspective on pro/con argumentation over 
shale gas extraction, see Lewinski 2016). 
I have elsewhere argued that the most significant perspective in 
light of which proposals are to be tested is a consequentialist one 
(Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012; Fairclough, 2016): would the 
consequences of a proposal, if adopted, be acceptable or not? The term 
“consequence” is used here broadly to refer to several types of states-of-
affairs: 
 
• the goals of the proposed action (as intended results or end-
states): for example, Cuadrilla’s immediate goal is to have their 
application approved, in order to move on to exploration and 
commercial exploitation, for the long-term stated goal of 
achieving energy security for the UK. 
• the risks involved, as potential unintended and undesirable 
consequences, e.g. water and soil contamination; 
• impacts on the natural environment, known to occur in the 
process of achieving the goals, e.g. the coming into existence of a 
drilling rig of a certain height, situated on a fracking pad of a 
certain size; 
• impacts on the institutional, social world, e.g. the coming into 
existence of a situation in which the rights of the local 
population are being infringed. 
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Impacts are different from risks. Impacts are known (not merely 
probable or possible) consequences: if agents want to achieve their 
goals, certain impacts will be unavoidable. By contrast, risks may or may 
not materialize. A visual impact on the landscape is an unavoidable 
impact if the goal is to exploit shale gas; causing an earthquake by 
drilling is a risk. In the case of risk, proposals with potentially 
unacceptable consequences may nevertheless be allowed to stand, if the 
risks can be “managed” or “controlled”. One way of managing risks is by 
being able to avoid them via a Plan B, an alternative course of action 
that agents can switch to if necessary; another is by transferring them to 
another party (e.g. by insuring against them in an acceptable way) 
(Miller, 2013). Agents may also choose to take the risk, if it is not 
possible or desirable to abandon the proposal. If the risk is accepted, 
then it is rational to try to minimize or optimize it, so as to reduce the 
probability and/or severity of the potential loss. 
Overall, in the LCC debate, the argument scheme underlying 
argumentation against the proposal was mainly argumentation from 
negative consequence, where the negative consequences were deemed 
to be unacceptable (critical objections). By contrast, the supporters of 
the proposal tended to argue from desirable goals (e.g. energy security) 
and other alleged positive consequences. Since the undesirable 
consequences could not be overlooked altogether, the supporters’ 
arguments tended to be of the pro/con type: impacts and risks were 
acknowledged, but were not considered serious enough to challenge the 
proposal, being allegedly mitigated and controlled in an acceptable way. 
 
3. DELIBERATION AS CRITICAL TESTING OF PROPOSALS: POSSIBLE 
OUTCOMES 
 
According to van Eemeren (2010, pp. 138-143), deliberation is a genre, 
at a higher level of abstraction than activity types. I suggest that 
argumentation in deliberative activity types can be succinctly 
represented as follows (Figure 1), where the conclusion of the practical 
argument from goals and circumstances (centre) is tested by a 
pragmatic argument from negative consequence (left). The pragmatic 
argument from negative consequence can potentially rebut the practical 
proposal (conclusion) itself if the consequences are deemed to be 
critical objections. To say that the conclusion “Agent ought to do A” is 
rebutted means that the opposite conclusion follows instead. For 
example, from the critic’s perspective, the (unintended) consequences 
of proposal A can be such that A had better not be performed, even if the 
goal can be achieved by doing A. If this is the case, a critical objection to 
A has been exposed, and the hypothesis that the agent ought to do A has 
been rebutted (refuted, falsified). However, if the negative 
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consequences, while undesirable, are not unacceptable, and do not 
therefore constitute critical objections against A – this could be because 
there is some “Plan B” or mitigating strategy in place, or because they 
can be traded off against positive consequences (outweighed by them) – 
then the conclusion in favour of A may still stand. Practical claims can 
also be tentatively supported by arguments from positive consequence 
(right-hand side). Positive consequences include desirable side effects 
that are not explicitly intended (are not goals that agents start from), 
but can be predicted to occur. Figure 1 is a development of the scheme 
proposed in Fairclough & Fairclough (2012), connecting two argument 
schemes, the practical argument from goals and the pragmatic 
arguments from positive and negative consequence. For convenience, 
only one goal, only one negative and only positive consequence are 
represented; there may be several of each, convergently supporting one 
conclusion or another. 
Let us assume that three alternative proposals are tested, A1, A2, 
A3, that can all presumably deliver a set of goals and possibly other 
positive consequences. Let us also assume that these goals have 
withstood critical questioning (they are not unacceptable) and the agent 
wants to achieve them. There is, potentially, a defeasible inference 
(from each of these sets of premises) to the conclusions Proposal A1, or 
A2, or A3 is recommended. Let us also assume that, by testing A1 (Figure 
1), it is found that, in addition to various positive consequences and 
possibly some counter-considerations, A1 has a range of unacceptable 
consequences, e.g. unacceptable risks or impacts. As critical objections, 
these will conclusively rebut A1 (so that the argument on the left-hand 
side of Figure 1 can be advanced), overriding whatever reasons in 
favour there may be (achievement of goals and other positive 
consequences). Thus, it can no longer follow, not even tentatively, that 
A1 is recommended, because it conclusively follows that A1 is not 
recommended, seeing as there are COs to A1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Proposal A1 is rebutted in light of critical objections 
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Let us now suppose that A2 is being tested (Figure 2). A2 can also deliver 
the goals and other positive consequences, and no critical objections 
come to light, which means it does not follow that A2 is not 
recommended (i.e. that potential inference, left-hand side, is now being 
undercut). Proposal A2 has therefore passed the critical test and can be 
provisionally maintained. If A1 and A2 were the only alternatives, then 
A2 would be chosen at this stage, because, unlike A1, A2 has no critical 
objections against it. If the potential conclusion on the left does not 
obtain (if it is not the case that A2 should not be performed – I have left 
the conclusion box blank, to suggest this), then what is left of the 
deliberation  scheme is what is commonly called a “conductive” argument 
which says: in spite of various counterconsiderations (in principle, 
reasons against A2), and seeing that there are no overriding reasons 
against A2, but a number of reasons in favour (e.g. it will achieve the 
goals and other desirable effects), and also seeing that there is no better 
alternative, A2 is the right course of action to achieve the goals.  
 
 
Figure 2. Proposal A2 has survived criticism (no COs, only reasons in favour and 
CCs): a “conductive” argument in favour of A2 is possible, if A2 is the only 
reasonable alternative. 
 
The negatively relevant reasons (undesirable consequences), which – 
had they been COs – would have supported the conclusion that A2 is not 
recommended, can thus be incorporated into the arguer’s case as 
counter-considerations (Figure 2). Unlike CCs, COs cannot be integrated 
into a conductive argument.  Whenever there are COs (Figure 1), the 
potential conductive argument in favour of A1 collapses into a deductive 
argument conclusively supporting the conclusion that A1 is not 
recommended. 
If more than one proposal passes the test, it is rational to choose 
one that is preferable from whatever perspective is important to the 
agents in the context. For example, for the opponents of fracking, the 
proposal to drill for shale gas in Lancashire was unreasonable, yet other 
proposals – for renewable energy sources –  passed the critical test. 
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Among renewables, all considered reasonable, some people might 
prefer solar, others wind or tidal energy, based on various criteria (cost, 
predictability of supply, etc.), weighed against each other in various 
ways. Essentially, in my view, the metaphor of weighing applies only at a 
later stage in the deliberation process, only in relation to proposals that 
have been found to be reasonable (i.e. without unacceptable 
consequences). Unacceptable consequences do not outweigh, but 
override the reasons in favour.2 
The situation where more than one alternative has survived 
criticism is represented in Figure 3, where A2 is finally chosen because it 




Figure 3: Proposal A2 has survived criticism (no COs, only reasons in favour and 
CCs): a “conductive” argument in favour of A2 is possible if A2 is preferable to 
other reasonable alternatives. 
 
The premises highlighted in bold in each figure are the equivalent of the 
OB (on-balance) premise, and come in two kinds: a premise expressing 
the absence of overriding reasons against doing A2 (no CC to A2 is a CO), 
and a premise expressing the preferability of A2 over A3. 
To recapitulate, all the alternative proposals put forward in 
response to the question “what should we do?” need to first pass the 
critical test of the deductive argument from negative consequence (left 
side of diagram). If one or more critical objections come to light, then it 
follows that the proposal is not recommended. Some proposals will be 
discarded at that stage, but some will pass the test and be allowed to 
stand, thus ending up on the right-hand side, tentatively supported (in 
light of the goals). To say that a proposal is recommended – i.e. asserting 
                                                             
2 If the critical testing process yields no reasonable alternatives, and all 
available courses of action have unacceptable consequences, yet a decision has 
to be made, the metaphor of weighing may also apply to the choice among 
unreasonable proposals, in order to choose not a better but a less bad 
alternative. 
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the conclusion on the right-hand side of the deliberation scheme – is to 
say that there are reasons in favour but, essentially, that there are no 
serious reasons against (i.e. no critical objections). In addition, it is to say 
either that the proposal in question is the only reasonable alternative, or 
that, among reasonable alternatives, it is preferable to other reasonable 
alternatives (e.g. it has fewer counterconsiderations, or more benefits, 
or both). (It is assumed here that the goals are acceptable and the agent 
wants to achieve them). 
There can be conclusive (deductive) arguments against a 
proposal but no conclusive arguments in favour of a proposal: any 
argument in favour can be defeated by new information, emerging 
feedback, etc. (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012; Fairclough, 2015; 2016). 
A proposal that, for an arguer, has withstood critical testing, together 
with the set of pro/con reasons that are positively/negatively relevant 
to it, will take the form of a so-called “conductive” argument in favour of 
that proposal. Figure 2 represents the situation when a proposal has 
passed the critical test, seeing as no counterconsideration is a critical 
objection. If this is indeed the case, then the conclusion in favour will be 
(defeasibly) supported, in light of the goals to be achieved, because the 
conclusion against is not supported, and the counterconsiderations are 
outweighed by the reasons in favour.  If, however, this is not the case, i.e. 
if one or more reasons against are critical objections (Figure 1, left), 
then the potential “conductive” argument in favour of that proposal 
disintegrates, collapsing into a deductive argument against it. 
As reasons against a practical conclusion, critical objections 
must be kept distinct from counterconsiderations. For every proposal 
there will be reasons against, however minor, but not every reason 
against a proposal is a critical objection. Unacceptable consequences, as 
critical objections, can rebut a proposal, conclusively indicating that it 
would be unreasonable to go ahead with it. Counterconsiderations can 
incline the balance towards one reasonable proposal or another, once 
the unreasonable ones have been weeded out.  The point at which 
reasons against, taken to be counterconsiderations, may (singly or 
collectively) turn into critical objections, or at which merely undesirable 
(negative) consequences become unacceptable consequences, is a 
matter for deliberating agents to decide for themselves.3 
                                                             
3 I have retained both the words “practical” and “pragmatic” because this is 
how the two schemes are discussed in the literature: Walton (2006; 2007) calls 
the argument from goals a “practical” argument, while van Eemeren (2010) 
calls the argument from consequence a “pragmatic” argument. These schemes 
cannot be conflated and are both operative in deliberative practice. In my 
account, the argument from consequence is used to test the conclusion of the 
argument from goals. In other words, the argument from consequence has a 
critical function, while the argument from goals has a motivational function. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
On a critical rationalist view, practical reasoning can be modelled as a 
critical procedure that filters out those conclusions (and corresponding 
decisions) that do not pass the critical test of whether the intended or 
unintended consequences are acceptable. Proposals are tested in light of 
their consequences. For any alternative A, it is in principle possible to 
find not only counterconsiderations but critical objections: this is why 
the two opposite conclusions should always be represented, and 
conductive argumentation is not a single argument, in my view, but one 
of two possible main outcomes of a deliberative process, understood as 
a process of critical testing of alternative proposals for achieving a goal. 
What appears to be a “conductive” argument is a particular 
argumentative configuration that may (or may not) appear in the 
temporal unfolding of a deliberative process. A proposal that has 
withstood critical testing (i.e. the con reasons are not COs but CCs), 
together with the sets reasons that are positively/negatively relevant to 
it, will take the form of a so-called “conductive” argument in favour of 
that proposal. Whenever critical objections do come to light in the 
course of deliberation, the potential “conductive” argument tentatively 
supporting A will collapse into a deductive argument in support of not 
doing A. Thus, “conductive” argumentation attempting to justify doing A 
materializes, or emerges as an actual pro/con argument, only in those 
situations when the reasons against doing A are taken to be mere 
conterconsiderations, not critical objections. As Figure 2 suggests, 
“conductive” argumentation is that particular situation in which the 
conclusion that A should not be performed, always possible in principle, 
does not follow (the inference to that conclusion is undercut), because 
none of the con reasons are strong enough to warrant that conclusion. In 
other words, there are no overriding reasons against A, only reasons in 
favour and counterconsiderations, the latter are outweighed by the 
former, so an argument in favour of doing A can be tentatively put 
forward. 
The two main configurations are presented in Figures 1 and 2, 
with Figure 3 being a variation of Figure 2, when more than one 
reasonable proposal has passed the test and they are now weighed 
against each other in order to choose one. The premises that fulfill the 
role of the OB premise (Hansen, 2011) are represented in bold, in each 
figure. Whenever there are no critical objections against a course of 
action, it does not follow that the agent should not do An (the inference 
to Proposal An is not recommended is undercut, as there are no 
overriding reasons why An should not be performed). Nor does it, 
nevertheless, follow (however defeasibly) that the agent should do An, 
unless, in addition to not having any unacceptable consequences, An is 
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the only course of action that will deliver the goals or is preferable to 
other reasonable alternatives. This is where “weighing” comes into the 
picture: to say that A2 is preferable to A3, among reasonable alternatives 
(and therefore recommended), is to say that the reasons (CCs) against 
A2 have been outweighed by the reasons (CCs) against A3, or that the 
reasons in favour of A2 outweigh those in favour of A3 (or both: A2 has 
comparatively fewer disadvantages and more advantages than A3, 
though neither would be an unreasonable course of action). Or, to say 
that A2 is recommended means that these two premises (in bold, in 
Figure 3) obtain: no CC to A2 is a CO, and A2 is in some sense preferable 
to its alternatives. These premises (in addition to whatever reasons in 
favour there are) are spread out across the various simple interrelated 
argument schemes that model deliberative activity types, which 
supports my claim that “conductive” argumentation must be analyzed at 
the “higher” level of genre, not as a type of argument.  
To conclude, a conductive argument is not a single argument 
with pro and con reasons, but a particular argumentative configuration 
or outcome of a process of critical testing, where two opposite 
conclusions (“Do A” and “Do not do A”) are always possible, and 
whichever becomes actualized for any given alternative depends on 
how that alternative survives critical testing. “Do not do A” follows 
conclusively when there are critical objections, in spite of there being 
reasons in favour (i.e. in such cases, “Do A” is rebutted, and the pro 
reasons are overridden). “Do A” follows defeasibly when there are no 
critical objections, only reasons in favour and counterconsiderations 
(e.g. merely undesirable, but not unacceptable consequences), and that 
particular alternative has fared comparatively better than others in the 
process of weighing reasons (e.g. its disadvantages are comparatively 
smaller, or its gains are comparatively superior to those of others, 
including doing nothing, etc.).  If there are no overriding reasons against 
doing A, the potential inference to “Do not do A” is undercut, the “Do A” 
alternative can stand (however tentatively), and the arguer’s argument 
may take the form of “conductive” argument saying: in spite of such-
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